*Security not Trident – CND publication
*Playing with Fire – Nuclear weapons incidents and accidents in the UK – Peter Burt – Feb 2017 – NIS
*Sub-Strategic Trident: A Slow Burning Fuse – Paul Rogers – London Defence Studies 34.
*UK Nuclear Weapons Statement – Rebecca Johnson 2016
*Commander Forsyth RN (Ret’d) – has kindly given permission to republish his articles here:-
- *Correspondence between Cdr R Forsyth & MOD_Dec 2017 – Nov 2018
- *Rob Forsyth’s Response to Admiral Gower’s assertion that UK Trident will only be used as a ‘Last Resort’ and that the Military are not involved in a decision to carry out an attack
- *Rob Forsyth’s 3 part document on UK Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Trident Nuclear Weapon System
- *Part 1 of Rob Forsyth’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Trident Nuclear Weapon System – The Concept of Nuclear Deterrence Examines all the arguments against UK ownership of Trident and examines the theory of nuclear deterrence which is flawed, unproven and poses significant dangers from accidental use.
- *Part 2 of Rob Forsyth’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Trident Nuclear Weapon System – A Review of UK Nuclear Weapon Policy The cost to the UK of maintaining the Trident Force has reduced our conventional forces to an unacceptably low level, the consequences of which have dangerously reduced the nuclear threshold
- *Part 3 of Rob Forsyth’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Trident Nuclear Weapon System – UK Nuclear Weapon Policy, International and Military Law, the UK Government’s Position and Consequences for Trident SSBN Commanding Officers Commanding Officers (COs) of Trident submarines are briefed that HMG policy of ‘deliberate uncertainty’ (so includes the possibility of First Use – wrongly referred to as ‘Last Resort’) is lawful; however, a majority of non-nuclear weapon States disagree and so do eminent international humanitarian lawyers. I suggest that this places COs in legal jeapordy if they obey a firing order without knowing the facts.
- * Rob Forsyth’s Postscript to UK Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Trident Nuclear Weapons System Subsequent to publishing Part 3, Rob engaged in an online debate with a former MoD nuclear policy officer. In answer to the question posed in Part 3 he stated that, uniquely, SSBN COs were lawfully absolved from responsibility because they did not know the facts. Rob disagreed. This postscript explains why. Rob wrote to the MoD asking if this was official Government opinion. The reply declines to answer the specific question.
- *Authorising Use of Military Force_Trident_PACAC Inquiry Submission_26.2.19
- *Oral evidence 12 march 2019_Qs79-88-1 PACAC Inquiry
* Brian Drummond’s Paper on the UK’s Nuclear deterrence policy being an unlawful threat of force
*Acronym’s Paper on the TPNW and what this means for Britain.
*Nuclear Weapons and International Law 2020 Conference Report by Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy & Global Security Institute.